Australia is experiencing a surge in data centre investment, driven by global technology companies such as Google and Amazon, major operators and developers including CDC, STACK, AirTrunk and Stockland, and growing demand from federal and state governments. Billions of dollars are being committed to infrastructure supporting artificial intelligence, cloud computing and secure government services.

Despite this growth, dedicated Australian guidance addressing the combined fire safety challenges of data centres remains limited. Beyond general Australian Standards and existing guidance such as the Fire and Rescue NSW Position Statement, designers need to address complex interactions between UPS batteries, 100s of standby diesel generators, millions of litters pf bulk fuel storage and high-voltage electrical infrastructure.

Fire Rescue Victoria (FRV) has released GL-53: Data Centre Design Guideline for industry consultation to clarify its expectations for data centre fire safety design. RSSM provided significant technical contributions during the public consultation process.

RSSM welcomes this much-needed guidance and believes it will help owners, developers and designers identify critical fire safety issues early, support more consistent design outcomes and reduce the risk of costly changes during approvals and construction. This article outlines the key considerations in GL-53 and what they mean for your project.

What is FRV GL - 53 Data Centre Design Guidance?

FRV GL-53 is Fire Rescue Victoria’s fire safety guideline for data centre developments within the FRV Fire District. Released for industry consultation in July 2026, it outlines FRV’s expectations for managing the interacting hazards of lithium-ion batteries, diesel fuel storage and high-voltage infrastructure to protect occupants, emergency responders, property and the environment.

The draft addresses thermal runaway, fire and explosion, toxic gas releases, electrical hazards and contaminated firewater runoff. It sets out design expectations for fire protection, emergency preparedness and firefighter access, drawing on Australian Standards, FM Global Data Sheets and NFPA 855. GL-53 calls for a site-specific Fire Safety Study (FSS) for all data centre developments within its scope. It also expects an early Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) for developments in high-density urban areas, near Major Hazard Facilities or adjacent to sensitive establishments. Its two-stage Application for Written Advice process covers design and pre-commissioning, with Stage 1 also applying to extensions and alterations to existing data centres.

What facilities do GL - 53 apply to?

GL-53 applies to all proposed data centre developments and alterations within the FRV Fire District that incorporate one or more of the following :

• Lithium-ion Battery (LiB) Systems: UPS units and co-located Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS).
• Class 1 (C1) Combustible Liquids: Bulk diesel storage and day-tanks for standby generators.
• High-Voltage Infrastructure: High-voltage switch rooms, substations, and oil-filled transformers.
• Other dangerous goods: Dangerous goods stored on site as defined under the Dangerous Goods (Storage and Handling) Regulations 2022 (Vic).

Developers and designers should identify these hazards early and address the relevant GL-53 expectations through consultation with FRV.

What triggers consultation with Emergency Services e.g. FRV, CFA?

FRV's Consultation with FRV may arise through several planning, dangerous goods and building approval pathways:

• Planning referrals: Referral under Section 55 of the Planning and Environment Act 1987 (Vic), where FRV is a relevant referral authority.
• Dangerous goods requirements: Written advice on fire protection systems and emergency planning under Regulations 52 and 53 of the Dangerous Goods (Storage and Handling) Regulations 2022 (Vic), where applicable.
• Performance Solutions: Fire authority consultation under NCC Clause A2G2(4)(a), where relevant to developing a fire safety Performance Solution.
• Building report and consent: An application to the Fire Rescue Commissioner under the Building Regulations 2018 (Vic) where prescribed fire safety matters trigger this requirement.
• Voluntary early engagement: Consultation initiated by developers, designers or operators to clarify FRV’s expectations before key design decisions are finalised.

The GL-53 expects engagement at the concept design stage, followed by design review and pre-commissioning verification. Identifying the relevant consultation pathways early helps incorporate fire safety measures into the site layout and design.

FRV is also a reporting authority under the Building Regulations 2018 (Vic). Where any prescribed fire matter does not meet NCC deemed-to-satisfy requirements, the report and consent of the Fire Rescue Commissioner must be obtained before construction commences.

The Three-Stage Consultation Process

To streamline compliance, FRV highlights primary hazard drivers alongside a structured two-stage Application for Written Advice (AWA) pathway under Regulations 51, 52 and 53 of the Dangerous Goods Regulations:

Approval Stage	Primary Details & Key Requirements
Planning and pre-planning stage	Department of Planning and Transport (DTP) referral to FRV and CFA – most likely requires a Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) and Fire Risk Assessment (FRA), which FRV Make a basis for Land use planning
Stage 2 AWA (Design Phase)	Submitted ≥ 3 months prior to construction; Requires completed AWA form, DG Manifest, DG compliance report, endorsed Fire Safety Study (FSS)
Stage 2 AWA (Pre-Commissioning)	Submitted ≥ 30 days prior to commissioning; requires final DG Manifests, Emergency Response Plan (ERP), Pre-Incident Plan (PIP), Emergency Information Book (EIB), and an on-site physical inspection by FRV.

What are the Key Technical Requirements?

GL-53 sets clear technical benchmarks to contain fires and protect structural integrity:

Protection System	Required Technical Standard / Benchmark
Fire Resistant Construction for Battery Storage Rooms and Generators	• Battery storage rooms: FRL of 240/240/240 (load bearing) and -/240/240 (non-load bearing) due to high thermal runaway heat loads. • Generator enclosures: Classified as Class 8 process structures under the NCC.
Sprinkler System Design	• Data halls: 8–12 mm/min design density (determined via FSS). • Lithium-ion battery storage areas = 12.2 mm/min • Diesel storage: 5 mm/min design density. • Systems >50 kWh: Must validate sprinkler design against UL 9540A or FM Global loss prevention guidelines DS 5-32 and 5-33
Hydrant Systems Design	• Simultaneous flow of ≥30 L/s across 3 streams per AS 2419.1-2021. • Reduced to 2 streams at 20 L/s inside sprinklered areas.
Gas and Fire Detection & Ventilation	• Aspirating Smoke Detection (ASD) in data halls. • Toxic off-gas detection in battery rooms. • Mechanical emergency ventilation keeping flammable gas <10% LEL per AS 2865. • Red VAD strobes with warning sign: BATTERY ROOM: TOXIC GASES DETECTED.
Firewater Containment	Firewater runoff containment capacity must be determined for the worst-case credible fire scenario

What does GL - 53 expect from proponents submitting a Planning Application?

Under Appendix A, FRV requires pre-planning submissions tailored to site location density:

• High-Density / Sensitive Sites: Require a Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), AWA form, DG Manifest, site layouts, and NCC A2G2 consultation records.
• Low-Density Sites: Require the same documentation package including a Fire safety study (FSS), except the PHA. PHA is only required if site is Located in a high-density urban area In close proximity to a Major Hazard Facility (MHF)
• PHA Methodology: Must align with NSW HIPAP 6 and 10 using quantitative consequence modelling for battery, DG, transformer, and natural hazards. Complete early to inform site and technology selection.

What does GL - 53 expect from proponents submitting a Fire Safety Study (FSS)?

An FSS must comply with FRV GL-54 (NSW HIPAP 2) and Section 8 of GL-53, include the following assessment at minimum:

• Facility Specifications: Complete data on battery chemistry, compartment FRLs, fuel storage, and transformers.
• Credible Scenarios: Modelling of thermal runaway, gas accumulation, toxic release, and pool fires.
• Site-Specific Modelling: Real-world facility calculations beyond generic UL 9540A test data.
• Gas Control: Ventilation designed to maintain flammable gas levels below 10% LEL.
• Safety & Environment: Protocols for firefighter safety, stranded energy, firewater retention, and chemical runoff.

FRV will not endorse an FSS in the absence of detailed facility information. At minimum, the FSS must be based on confirmed battery chemistry, rack configuration, UPS specifications, fire compartment layout, fuel storage details, and substation/transformer specifications

Does GL - 53 apply only to data centres with lithium-ion batteries?

No. While lithium-ion systems (UPS and BESS) are a primary focus, GL-53’s scope encompasses all co-located hazards, including bulk diesel storage, high-voltage switch rooms, substations, firewater runoff, and cooling system chemicals. Because risk assessments evaluate site-specific hazard profiles, facilities using alternative battery chemistries or fuel configurations are still subject to assessment against their actual dangerous goods and operational risks.

What happens if my project doesn't meet GL - 53?

GL-53 key requirements draw directly from mandatory Victorian legislation—including Dangerous Goods and Building Regulations. Departures from these expectations require extensive technical justification, mandatory stakeholder consultations, and Fire Rescue Commissioner consent, which can trigger costly redesigns and project delays.

When should I involve Risk engineers and consultants?

Right at the start. Bringing risk engineers into the concept design phase is the most effective way to protect your project’s budget and schedule. Specialist guidance early on ensures your site selection, facility layout, and regulatory applications align with FRV expectations before costly design revisions become necessary.  

What happens if the PHA uses an unsuitable methodology or fails to demonstrate acceptable risk for surrounding land uses?

The PHA must use a recognised methodology, such as HIPAP 6, HIPAP 10 and assess risks against appropriate land use safety criteria, including HIPAP 4 where applicable. It must demonstrate that the proposed development is suitable for its location, considering neighbouring properties, sensitive uses and potential incident escalation.

An inadequate PHA may prevent FRV from supporting the proposal and leave the planning authority, including DTP where applicable, without sufficient evidence to grant a permit. Further assessment, design changes or additional risk controls may be required.

The PHA is a study that informs the planning decision. Where its findings are needed to establish land use suitability, it should be completed and assessed before the permit is determined, rather than deferred to a permit condition. Conditions may require implementation of the identified controls or subsequent detailed design studies.

Engaging consultants without relevant experience can result in inadequate assessments, repeated authority reviews and significant planning delays. These delays can increase consultancy, redesign, financing and project holding costs. Where government funding is tied to approval or delivery milestones, delays may also jeopardise funding eligibility or lead to the loss of committed funding.

Contact Risk and Safety Solutions Melbourne (RSSM), who are experienced in end-to-end GL-53 compliance - from Preliminary Hazard Analyses (PHA) and consequence modelling to dangerous goods reporting and AWA management. Partnering with RSSM protects your timeline, reduces capital risk, and keeps your project moving.